Author: Rover
Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831), a Prussian (Prussia was part of the German Empire) viewed war to be rational, very much much like Emperor Wu's general Sun Tsu. War, he believed was done to achieve a specific objective, and when that objective was achieved war would end, human lives were never sacrificed unnecessarily. Though Clausewitz has written several books, two books, "On War" and "Principles of War", are the most famous. The principles of war that Clausewitz introduced, nine in all, are still taught in all military academies throughout the world, and also are behind the military doctrines in many great armies of the world.
These nine principles are: mass, objective, unity of command, security, economy of force, maneuver, offensive, surprise and simplicity.
Here I will briefly explain what each of these are and give out an example from Sri Lanka's war against terror, fought between the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE or the Tigers, a group that is designated as a terrorist group in many countries) and the GSL (Government of Sri Lanka).
1. Mass: Here a military commander tries to achieve military superiority at a decisive place and time.
Karuna Amman (real name: Mr. Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan), a former LTTE deputy leader who defected to GSL (in March 2004) was highly skilled in achieving military superiority in decisive battles, mostly using human wave type of attacks (LTTE refers to these as Ceaseless Waves), despite having a smaller overall fighting force when compared to GSL. This, Karuna achieved mostly by targeting isolated GSL garrisons; so he basically decided the place and time to unleash his operation. So through this, although the GSL had greater man power, Karuna's tactics made sure that he achieved military superiority when it mattered.
How are human wave type operations neutralized? Area weapons such as MBRLs (Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers) are very effective against foot soldiers attempting human wave attacks. This can be witnessed by the decline in ceaseless waves with the introduction of the MBRLs units by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA). The MBRLs were first introduced into this war (in 2000) when the LTTE units were on the peak of a highly effective war against the SLA troops. The LTTE units, through a covert operation, a human wave attack, and by using area weapons (including small MBRLs units) had overrun a major military complex (Elephant-Pass camp), touted to be the gateway to Jaffna, the ideological capital of the Tamil Eelam, and were on their way to conquer the whole of Jaffna Peninsular when the MBRL units were introduced. Shortly afterwards, the Tigers had to give up their ceaseless waves due to high causalities.
In the presence of force multipliers like MBRLs, for human waves to succeed, infantry would need heavy armor (APCs) or an unprecedented number of soldiers, both of which the LTTE does not have. One of the few obvious ways for LTTE to mount a successful human waves type attack, at present, is to do a covert operation to take out the area weapons and then attack the fortifications/camps.
Interestingly, Karuna defected sometime after witnessing the GSL counterstrike using the MBRLs in Jaffna. Among other things, for example his personal conflicts with the tiger supremo Prabhakaran, Karuna must also have realized it would be useless to continue with the human wave type of attacks when faced with a force multiplier like the MBRLs.
Use of mass (achieving military superiority) can also mean using other units such as tanks and gunships, and not just infantry. But this is of little significance to discuss here as LTTE does not have a sizable mechanized division or a significant air force. However, LTTE also used wave types attacks using their naval wing (the sea tigers). The modus operandi here was usually to target a single Dvora (an Israeli built fast attack craft) using many tiger boats, including suicidal-boats which were often hidden among civilian fishing crafts. Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) lost several crafts to this type of attack over the years. However, the introduction of better radar, larger caliber guns, swarming techniques (using the Arrow Boats - a type of highly maneuverable Sri Lankan made attack craft that can be mass produced to be used as a swarming craft) and use of combined arms tactics have rendered the sea tiger units almost obsolete.
2. Objective : Here the commander aims to achieve his target (or goal), and does not look beyond that.
To exemplify this, GSL in August 2006 came up with the objective to liberate the areas held by the LTTE. During the last three years, the operation to achieve this objective has continued, and currently the LTTE are restricted to a very small area (about 5% of the pre 2006 area held by the rebels) close to Mullativu jungles. Both the political and military leadership in Sri Lanka were very focused in getting to this objective, which is anticipated to be achieved soon.
3. Unity of command : Unified effort led by a single person/group/perspective.
This is not strictly a Clausewitzian priciple, but he has discussed this phenomenon in most of his work, so it can be included here.
Since the inception of the current conflict, a unified effort was exerted by the secretary for defense of GLS (Lt Colonel Gotabhaya Rajapakse) and his top most military commanders to defeat the LTTE using combined arms efforts. There was absolutely no deviation on the major objective despite heavy resistance at some instances by even the regional and global super powers. This unambiguity on the unity of command was instrumental in all three forces (SLA, Sri Lankan Air Force and Sri Lanka Navy) in planning for the future.
This unity of command can also be seen within each of these three forces. For example in Sri Lanka Army (SLA). General Sarath Fonseka invested a lot of time and effort in effectively unleashing Special Forces (SF) for decapitation strikes of the LTTE military leadership, and to keep off the heavy artillery guns away from the SLA's regular units. Though General Fonseka reached his retirement age, the political leadership of GSL extended his service period to make sure that SLA maintain the unity of command.
However, the LTTE was in utter disarray after the initial resistance they offered in 2006. They sometimes built earth bunds to prevent the SF and regular forces from breaching their area of control; but they soon realized that through this they were forced to being concentrated to a smaller area where Sri Lanka Airforce (SLAF) and the SLA's area weapons, together with the SF units were able to pick them out more effectively. This led to several altercations between the top LTTE field commanders, which eventually led to several reversals by not having a unity of command.
4. Security : Here, not allowing enemy to neutralize your other advantages is emphasized.
The use of deep penetration units and small Special Forces teams by the GSL led to the downfall of the LTTE security. These SLA covert units were able to wreak havoc within LTTE by picking out leaders (like the intelligence wing "colonel" Charles) military assets and communications centers. By adopting a different style of offense, SLA was effectively able to breach the security of the LTTE and destabilize its fighting capabilities.
5. Economy of Force : Here the wise usage of ones troops is emphasized. Through implementing economy of force, a commander could achieve significant objectives with limited forces.
LTTE for many years, prior to the current conflict (Eelaam war iv) have used economy of force effectively. They were a itinerant guerrilla force, that attacked GSL assets and personnel almost regularly but that could also be assembled at short notice to attack GSLs strategic points and larger garrisons.
GSL commanders also used economy of force effectively in the current context. As an example, the usage of SFs to counter the threat to regular troops and assets can be considered. If regular forces were used to neutralize the LTTE's area weapons, SLA would have seen high causalities, as area weapons need to target large troop concentrations to be effective (LTTE has a smaller chance in detecting a smaller SF team).
6. Maneuver : Here the commander aims to take his troops to an advantageous position (or alternatively, move the enemy troops to a disadvantageous position).
Two of the highly mobile mechanized armored divisions (MADs) of GSL were guarding the Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil (MNK) FDL, which is the gateway to the Jaffna city. One of the major objectives of LTTE has been to take the Jaffna city by overcoming this FDL, and the counter objective of GSL had been to take the strategically important Elephant Pass camp, which was lost in year 2000.
These MADs attacked the MNK FDL several times incurring heavy losses to itself. This was mostly because it was a narrow and open FDL, with a remarkable array of tank-traps and trenches built by the LTTE, which made any troops trying to traverse it susceptible to area and direct fire weapons of the LTTE (however, these maneuvers by MADs forced the LTTE to dedicate large amounts of their cadre to their FDL).
To release these MADs, GSL maneuvered an offensive division to take the strategic town of Paranthan. This maneuver directly threatened the rear of the LTTE units guarding the NMK FDL; which in turn made these units to abandon the FDL, freeing MADs to take the whole peninsular without much of a fight. This is one of the best, major maneuvers in this conflict; here the GSL moved its troops to an advantageous position, while forcing the LTTE units into a disadvantageous position.
7. Offensive : This is seizing the initiative, and is self explanatory.
Here I will give two examples when the initiative was seized and not seized.
When Karuna defected to GSL in 2003 with a sizable group of his former terrorist carder, Ranil Wickramasinghe (then the prime minister of the country, and now the leader of the opposition) and Chandrika Kumaranatunga (former president of Sri Lanka) did not seize the opportunity to attack the LTTE. This gave time for the LTTE to reorganize, attack most of its opponents (including the defected cadre) and get stronger (eg. procure arms). So it took two more years for the GSL to start the war against the terrorists.
When Mavillaru sluice gates were closed, President Mahinda Rajapakse (current president of GSL) and the GSL military leadership seized the initiative to attack the LTTE. This was a time when LTTE was getting negatively noted by the International Community (IC) for not respecting the terms of a ceasefire (CFA - an agreement between the UNP government and the LTTE), assassinating a moderate tamil foreign minister of GSL and illegal arms procurement among other things. The closing down of the sluice gates created a humanitarian catastrophe in the region and GSL promptly seized this opportunity to attack the LTTE, an effort that led to GSL's own war against terrorism without getting too much flack from the IC.
8. Surprise : Here, attacking the enemy when they least expect is advocated.
Major General Jagath (Chula) Dias, a brilliant young commander of SLA, surprised the LTTE units in the battle for Vavunikulam. This commander managed to station his troops to the rear of the LTTE elite units that were waiting in anticipation of SLA's 57 division troop advance. Later, GSL troops managed to trap and decimate several of these elite LTTE units, demoralizing the other LTTE units that were about to enter war in Mallavi.
9. Simplicity : Here, clear plans and orders are given to avoid confusion.
In guerrilla warfare, the plans are simple. Usually the objective is to get a target when and where necessary; improvisation is very much allowed. An LTTE suicide bombing operation can be viewed as such. Though this type of mission would require a lot of handlers and logistics support, the final mission in itself is simple. The bomber is asked to get a target and if this becomes impossible, and is faced with imminent capture, the bomber is expected to blast himself, causing what ever damage to the public. This is what the LTTE woman suicide bomber did when she tried to assassinate Mr. Douglas Devananda (GSL minister of Social Services and Social Welfare) in 2007. The woman passed through a security check point, arrived at a secondary screening booth, when she was sure that she was discovered as an LTTE terrorist, she exploded herself killing the officers manning that booth, and terrorized the civilians (another objective of terrorist groups).
Folks, Sri Lanka's independence day (2009) inspired me to write this small account. I wrote it to a general audience and deliberately left out details as much as possible. I also wrote this in haste due to time constraints, and may have some mistakes, please point those out. Thank you!
And feel free to cite this if ever you need it.
Mate Rover,
ReplyDeleteWell thought article mate. I really enjoyed reading it. Please publish more articles.
Cheers
Gutikewa,
ReplyDeleteThank you mate, I will try to write several more articles when the time permits (will tell that to you guys on DW, when I do write one).
Cheers.....
Hi Rover, congratulations on making a new blog.
ReplyDeleteI have a few comments which I hope will not detract from your excellent article.
1. Karuna was one of the LTTE's best commanders, but the greatest commander was Balraj. Balraj was the one who developed the so-called "human wave" tactics, which were not hordes of cadre flinging against prepared defenses, but were rather the concentration of fighting power against the weakest point and then exploiting the breakthrough. I think that is what you meant by mass. Anyway by 1996 the LTTE did not have to rely on human waves as it had captured enough artillery guns and mortars to rely on stand-off fires.
MBRLs I think are a bit overrated- you can neutralize enemy firepower by "hugging" him and forcing him to choose whether or not to fire on his own position. The SLA's real strength were the LRRPs which forced the Tigers to disperse their strength (ie- not mass). RABS and its Arrows that you mentioned were the SLN's version of the LRRPs.
2. I like how you mentioned that the political and military leadership had the same objective. That is what messed us up in the past, when our objective was to pressure the LTTE into peace talks, rather than to destroy it.
3. Again Rajapaksas approached unity of command very differently from Premadasa or Chandrika, who practiced disunity of command because they were insecure and scared of the military. There were Defense Ministers/Dep Defense Ministers, Defense Secretaries, OOCs, CDSs, and Army Commanders all who had different priorities, and it was unclear who was in charge.
Mahinda did not hand the task of running the war to a politician. Instead he gave it to Uncle Gota who as Defense Secretary was in charge of the entire war effort. Underneath him were the service commanders. The CDS was simply an advisor. Everything was streamlined in unity.
4. Not only was LTTE's security disrupted, but the security forces did a great job with their own security (with some exceptions, like the AAB attack). Fonseka made sure that the SLA held onto all captured territory.
Great job, Rover!
Hello Wijayapala,
ReplyDeleteThank you very much for your inputs which, as always, I value very much.
I am in general agreement with all four of your points.
On point 1., yes, they would naturally attack the weakest point, but even within the weakest point, there would be a relatively strong point (for example a machine gun nest). And the ceaseless waves are directed at this "strong point within a overall weaker point" if I may use that expression. So it is a question of perspective, and yes, a fine commander directing his troops would find this "weakest" point to concentrate his troops.
Just for the information for others, since a FDL or the perimeter of a garrison is dynamic, a weak point can quickly become a strong point (say by tactically moving several LMGs to a weak point), so surprise would also play a big part in this.
Karuna I think, as you also agree, was a more thoughtful/intelligent commander than Balaraj, and used what Balaraj initiated to great effect.
Rover,
ReplyDelete"Karuna I think, as you also agree, was a more thoughtful/intelligent commander than Balaraj, and used what Balaraj initiated to great effect."
I consider Balraj as the superior commander; Balraj was the one who largely came up with these tactics, so the title of thoughtful/intelligent belongs to him. Balraj was also the mastermind of the complex operation that resulted in the 2000 defeat at EPS.
I've read Karuna's interviews and he does not seem like a very thoughtful person. He knows the right buttons to push with Sinhala listeners, but he's very bombastic and boastful about himself. I can understand why he was popular with his troops, but I haven't seen much self-introspection.
It makes little difference now that Balraj is dead as Karuna is an MP with Mahinda.
Hello Wijayapala,
ReplyDeleteThanks again for yours views mate. Yes, Balaraj was also a smart commander. But for EPS battle, he used "combined arms tactics", if I may use the term. He used a covert team (that was placed behind SLA forward lines) to cause confusion among SLA and for directing artillery, small MBRLs fire (at this point in time, SLA didn't have any MBRLS, so for the LTTE this was a huge advantage, a very effective force multiplier), long range artillery fire, and then Ceaseless Waves to actually break through the SLA defenses and overrun the camp.
So Balaraj was intelligent enough to coordinate all these LTTE units to get at his final goal, but it was not a CW operation alone.
Balaraj was also the guy who introduced, in a modern context ("credit" for him for that!), CW operations in the Sri Lanaka. However, human wave attacks have occurred throughout the historical period, and the LTTE (through Balraj) only adapted this tactic from the wars such as the Russian front in WWII, Germanic wars ect. So the introduction of CW, per se, is not a great achievement.
Given that Karuna is a smart student (4-A s for his A-levels!), and is reportedly a avid student of military history, he played a big role in LTTE battles.
Anyway, as Balaraj is dead and Karuna survived and has been able to pass on his genes to the next generation, I guess, Karuna is the fitter surviver, and hence a more intelligent guy on the longer run.
Anyway, I too don't like Karuna's sycophantic nature to the political leaders, and as you say his bombastic attitude. These are qualities that would make him another bull-like future Sri Lankan politician (ones that we Sri Lankans are so accustomed to, unfortunately).
I would like a shrewd politician like Anandasangaree (the TULF leader who is a teacher and a lawyer, who also won the UNESCO prize for tolerance and non-violence) to Karuna, any day.
But when you consider the smartness (or the lack of it) of the current population in Sri Lanka, Karuna is a more popular survivor (among those people)!